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1 Introduction
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (CLV) have embarked on
market-oriented reforms since the mid-1980s. While
sharing several similarities, the reforms and
international integration processes of CLV have
differed significantly, in terms of both pace and extent.
Despite being initiated in 1986, the market-oriented
reform measures in Cambodia have been
accelerated, with wider scope, only since 1989. At
the end of 1993, the reforms were notably
strengthened, especially with a programme for
rehabilitation and reconstruction introduced by the
newly elected government. Since 2001, Cambodia
has made considerable progress in some key
structural reform areas; however, the
implementation of some other important structural
reforms has been delayed and uneven. After the
accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2003, despite some delays, its government has made
significant efforts in legislation work. Cambodia then
committed to drastic market-oriented reforms
within a transitional period of five years.
Laos officially commenced its economic transformation
under the New Economic Mechanism in 1986. Similar
to Cambodia, Laos accelerated economic reforms1 in
1989, and has made more significant progress towards
a market economy since 1992. Nevertheless, the
momentum of economic reform in Laos flagged during
1997–8 when the regional financial crisis erupted. Since
mid-1999, in response to the deteriorating
macroeconomic environment, the country has
undertaken strong stabilisation measures by tightening
fiscal and monetary policies. After 2000, Laos had
made certain progress in market-oriented reforms,
particularly structural reforms in public expenditure
management, monitoring and restructuring state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), as well as strengthening its
financial sector since July 2002. The overall pace,
however, has been slow.
Vietnam officially introduced Doimoi (Renovation) in
1986, but only started a radical and comprehensive
reform package aiming at stabilising and opening the
economy in 1989. However, during 1996–9, reforms
were somewhat retarded, particularly after the Asian
financial crisis. Since 2000, a new wave of economic
reforms has been stirred up with emphasis on
structural reforms (SOE and financial reforms),
development of the private sector, and further trade
and investment liberalisation. The years 2000–6
witnessed a boom of private sector and deeper
international economic integration.2 Meanwhile, the
reforms of SOE sector, banking system, and public
administration were slower than expected.
The market-oriented reforms have led to major
changes in the CLV economies. Undoubtedly,
liberalisation of trade and balance of payments (BOP)
has contributed significantly to their economic
growth and development during the 1990s and in
the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the financial and
currency crises in the 1990s, especially the Asian
crisis in 1997–8, showed that this process, if
implemented improperly, could involve risks.
This article attempts to shed light on possible risks
associated with the key macroeconomic
fundamentals, current account (CA) balance and
capital flows, financial system and foreign exchange
policies in CLV. Section 2 discusses the problem of
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getting fundamentals right in the three economies.
Not only growth and export performance and CA
balance, but their sustainability and dynamism are also
under consideration. Section 3 examines both the
adequacy of capital flows as sources of financing CA
deficits as well as the external debt burden CLV are
facing. Section 4 then provides a primary analysis of
how vulnerable CLVs’ financial system is, especially in
regards to the banking sector. Section 5 discusses the
appropriateness of exchange rate regimes and the
levels of international reserves in CLV. Section 6
concludes by giving some policy recommendations for
CLV to sustain economic growth, while mitigating the
possible financial risks.
2 Getting the fundamentals right?
Since the Asian crisis, CLV have experienced quite
rapid economic growth, despite adverse shocks
including the global and regional economic
slowdown in 2001, the outbreaks of the severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the
ongoing threat from avian influenza since 2004, and
particularly the persistent high rise in oil prices in
recent years. Higher economic growth in Cambodia
and Vietnam has been associated with lower
consumer price index (CPI) inflation (Figure 1). The
CLV exports have expanded relatively fast and they
are now very open in terms of trade to GDP,
especially in the cases of Cambodia and Vietnam.
Notably, all three economies have experienced huge
trade deficits but relatively low CA deficits (Table 1).
The Cambodian economy has performed quite
impressively. GDP growth in the last five years
averaged at around 9 per cent per annum, and even
reached double-digit levels in 1999, 2004 and 2005
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 4  July 2007 97
Table 1 CLV trade performance and CA balance, 2000–5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cambodia
Merchandise export growth (%) – 12.5 11.7 15.5 22.1 17.6
Merchandise import growth (%) – 7.9 10.7 10.4 24.7 23.0
Trade balance as % GDP –14.9 –13.2 –13.2 –11.6 –13.6 –16.4
Trade openness (total trade/GDP; %) 91.4 92.3 95.2 99.9 107.6 110.4
CA balance (% GDP) –3.1 –1.2 –1.2 –3.2 –3.6 –5.1
Laos
Merchandise export growth (%) 0.9 –3.2 1.8 17.9 7.4 27.4
Merchandise import growth (%) 1.4 –3.6 5.2 8.4 9.5 12.7
Trade balance as % GDP –4.9 –4.8 –5.4 –5.8 –13.8 –10.9
Trade openness (total trade/GDP; %) 52.1 49.7 50.1 48.8 68.8 71.2
CA balance (% GDP) –7.3 –4.6 –2.3 –0.3 –0.5 –1.8
Vietnam
Merchandise export growth (%) 25.5 3.8 11.2 20.6 31.5 23.5
Merchandise import growth (%) 33.2 3.7 21.8 27.8 26.7 18.1
Trade balance as % GDP –3.7 –3.6 –8.7 –12.8 –12.0 –9.5
Trade openness (total trade/GDP; %) 96.6 95.6 104.0 114.7 128.6 133.4
CA balance (% GDP) 2.1 2.1 –1.7 –4.7 –2.0 0.3
Notes IMF (2005) for figures of Laos; data of 2003 are estimated; ADB (2005) for Laotian figures in 2004,
figures for 2005 are projected.
Source Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (2006), ICSEAD (2006), IMF (2005) and ADB (2005)
and authors’ estimation.
(Figure 1). In 2006, its estimated growth rate declined,
but remained strong at about 9 per cent. Such
dynamism of the Cambodian economy has resulted
primarily from rapid growth of the industry and
services sector, both at 12.1 per cent in 2005.
Manufacturing was the best performer in terms of
growth rate and sustainability during 1995–2005.
Notably, the garment sub-sector plays an important
role in the manufacturing and export performance of
the country. Tourism has largely dominated the service
sector. After being severely hit in 1997 and 1998, the
tourism sector has recovered quickly since 1999, as
restored consumer confidence fuelled an expansion of
domestic and foreign demand for services.
Cambodia’s exports and imports have experienced
high growth rates in recent years. During 2001–5,
annual export growth was at two-digit level, and
was noticeably faster after WTO accession in 2003.
A similar trend can be seen in the country’s imports.
Consequently, Cambodia has become one of the
most open nations in terms of trade to GDP
(110.4 per cent in 2005). However, higher growth
and bigger volume of imports have resulted in a
huge trade deficit (Table 1).
High export growth in Cambodia resulted largely
from its relatively early access to the US (in 1996) and
European Union (EU) market on a Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP) basis. These markets
respectively accounted for almost all garment
exports of Cambodia in 2005 (Suiwah et al. 2005),
which in turn accounted for half of overall export
growth in 2004.3
Despite high growth, the Cambodian export base is
still extremely narrow, comprising essentially of
garment and tourism. Garment export has since 1998
become the single largest export item (36.4 per cent)
and occupied a predominant share in total exports of
goods and services. The number of agriculture and
aquaculture export items is very few, with relatively
small shares since 2000 (Suiwah et al. 2005). Together
with high trade openness, this narrow export base has
resulted in large fluctuations in export turnover.
Notably, among the three economies, Cambodia has
faced the highest (two-digit) merchandise trade
deficit during the 2000s. But thanks to the net
service export surplus (largely contributed by the
tourism sector) and official transfer, the CA deficit
has been substantially reduced.
Laos has recorded a relatively stable annual growth
rate of about 6–7 per cent since 2000; the lowest
among the CLV countries.4 Despite being the biggest
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Figure 1 GDP growth vs. inflation in CLV, 1998–2006
sector, agriculture has played a declining role in the
country’s economic growth; its growth decreased
from 8.2 per cent in 1999 to about 2.2 per cent in
2003.
The Laotian merchandise export performance has not
been as good as in Cambodia. During 1999–2003,
exports and imports have exhibited unclear growth
trend; in particular, the growth rate of merchandise
export was very low. However, with the opening up
and expansion of gold and copper mines since 2003,
the surge in mining exports led to an estimated
50 per cent of total export growth in 2005.
Like the case of Cambodia, the Laotian export base is
very narrow, mainly comprising wood products,
garments and electricity. The export markets are also
very limited in number, comprising the EU (garment),
Thailand (wood products and electricity) and Japan and
the USA (timber and furniture), due to reasons such as
landlocked geography, a primitive infrastructure and
relatively limited economic integration.
Despite huge trade deficits, Laotian CA deficit has
also been much narrowed thanks to foreign
exchange earnings from the tourism sector, official
transfer, and particularly from private overseas
remittances.
Vietnam has achieved quite remarkable economic
growth, averaging at 7.5 per cent p.a. during 2001–5.
In 2006, the growth rate is estimated at 8.2 per
cent. Among CLV, Vietnam is perhaps the most
industrialised nation (Table 2). During 2001–5, the
industry–construction sector grew most rapidly
(10.24 per cent per annum), and made the greatest
contribution to growth. Growth rates of services and
agriculture–forestry–fisheries sector moderated at
nearly 7 per cent and 3.8 per cent per annum
(CIEM 2006).
For over two decades, Vietnam’s international trade
has expanded rapidly in absolute terms and relative
to GDP. The ratio of total merchandise trade to GDP
increased from about 50 per cent in 1990 to over
133 per cent in 2005. Its trade growth, attaining
mostly at two-digit level in recent years, has
outpaced those of Cambodia and Laos (Table 1).
Like Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam experienced a
rather high trade deficit. But unlike those countries,
Vietnam has persistently suffered from a relatively
huge deficit in both trade and services (interest
payment and FDI profits). Yet Vietnam seems to have
no problem with the CA, which has even been in
surplus in 2005 due to the large amount of private
transfers, at US$3–4 billion (Table 1). Moreover, its
export base has been relatively broad both in terms of
commodity and market, and has been widened and
diversified.
The impressive external performance has been
largely due to increasing trade and investment
liberalisation and market-oriented reforms, large
pools of low-cost labour and natural resources, and
sizeable FDI inflows.
Given the rather good macroeconomic performance, a
natural question to be asked is: can the CLV sustain
economic growth and trade performance? The answer
is, in the medium term, the three economies can
maintain rather high growth, yet risks of
unsustainability remain.
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Table 2 CLV economic structure by sector, 2000–5 (%; current price)
Cambodia Laos Vietnam
2000 2003 2005 2000 2003 2005 2000 2003 2005
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 35.9 33.2 31.4 52.1 49.1 46.0 24.6 22.5 20.7
Industry 21.8 25.8 27.0 23.5 25.7 27.9 36.7 39.5 40.8
Services 37.1 36.1 36.2 24.4 25.2 26.1 38.7 38.0 38.5
Notes Total shares of three sectors of Cambodia do not equal 100% because in its GDP structure does not
include the component ‘taxes less subsidies’; Laotian data on 2005 are estimates.
Source Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (2006), IMF (2005), CIEM (2006).
For the Cambodian economy, the discovery of off-
shore oil and natural gas could double the country’s
economic growth rate, as the oil and gas production
projects are planned to start-up in 2009 and 2011,
respectively. Apart from positive impacts of WTO
accession, non-garment sectors are also expected to
develop faster as private sector reform has been
accelerated. The agricultural sector promises a further
development due to the diversification process and
increasing infrastructure investment.
Yet certain risks of unsustainable economic growth
persist in Cambodia. First, as previously mentioned, its
economic growth relies heavily on garment
manufacturing/export and tourism, which are both
vulnerable to domestic and external shocks. For
example, in the near future, its garment exports to the
US and EU markets could significantly slow down as
these countries are scheduled to remove safeguard
measures against very competitive garment exports
from China. The narrow base of economic growth
creates a pressing need to nurture new sources with
significantly higher rates of productivity and investment.
Nevertheless, increase in public investment is
constrained by the very limited government revenue
base, while private investment is impeded by an
unfavourable business environment (ADB 2005).
Second, from the experience of East Asia, high
domestic savings are vital for sustainable economic
growth in the long term. The country’s gross domestic
saving rate has significantly increased, but was still very
low and virtually unchanged during 2000–5 (about
17 per cent of GDP). Nonetheless, it was a climb from
an average level of 11.1 per cent during 1995–9 (Table 3).
Last, but not least, the sustainability of economic
growth depends to a significant extent on the
effectiveness and efficiency of macroeconomic
management and the above-mentioned
restructuring reforms and WTO accession
commitment implementation.
Regarding the Laotian economy, it may be difficult
to achieve a higher and sustainable growth in the
longer term. As mentioned earlier, key impeding
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Table 3 Savings and investment in CLV, 2000–5 (% of GDP)
Cambodia Laos Vietnam
2000 2003 2005 2000 2003 2005 2000 2003 2005
Domestic savings 17.6 16.4 17.1 16.3 20.5 NA 27.1 27.4 30.0
Total investment 20.6 19.4 21.4 20.4 NA NA 29.6 35.4 38.9
Source Vo Tri Thanh (2006), Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (2006) and
www.unctad.org/sections/ldc_dir/docs/ldcmisc20053_lao_en.pdf
Table 4 Key indicators of CLV’s external debts, 2000–5 (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Debt service (% of export of goods and services)
Cambodia 8.0 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.3 1.9
Laos 5.7 7.8 8.9 6.8 9.4 16.3
Vietnam 10.5 10.6 8.3 8.0 6.7 6.1
Total external debt/GDP
Cambodia 65.6 62.7 64.0 64.9 58.9 51.7
Laos 83.2 82.7 88.8 104.0 90.8 112.8
Vietnam 41.1 38.5 38.0 39.9 38.0 35.2
Source ADB (2005), ICSEAD (2006); IMF (2004), IMF (2006a, b, c); Cambodia Ministry of Planning (2006).
factors include: (a) a small industrial base and heavy
dependence on subsistence agriculture; (b) landlocked
geography, with a rudimentary infrastructure, and
limited external and internal telecommunications;
(c) lack of human resources and low domestic savings
(20.5 per cent GDP in 2003); (d) persistent
macroeconomic instability, particularly double-digit
inflation rates over recent years; and (e) heavy trade
and economic dependence on the regional
countries,5 particularly Thailand, which means a
higher risk of being affected by contagion from
economic slowdown in neighbouring countries.
Despite being more advanced, Vietnam is still
challenged in terms of economic growth
sustainability due to numerous weaknesses and
constraints. Her export structure is still characterised
by a large proportion of agriculture and semi-
processed, low value-added merchandises, which are
very vulnerable to trade shocks or disputes. The
shares of manufacturing and high-tech exports are
still relatively small, with the share of the former
being equivalent to its East Asian counterparts in the
1980s (about 40 per cent). A significant shift in
economic (by sector and ownership) and export
structure has taken place, but is still insufficient to
ensure sustainable growth.
Furthermore, the country’s economic growth has for
years been dominated by the SOEs and relied on
State investment,6 which accounted for more than
50 per cent of total investment but with low
efficiency. The SOEs are the very principal debtors of
the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). With
an uncertain level of contingent government
liabilities associated with the need to restructure
SOEs and SOCBs, debt sustainability could eventually
come under threat (IMF 2006c).
It is projected that Vietnam’s trade and current
account deficits will continue. However, this would
lead to no serious outcomes if capital ‘productivity’
gains outweigh financing costs of the deficits. Thus,
it is crucial to ensure a high long-term sustainability
of the deficits and external debts.
3 Capital flow adequacy and external debt
burdens
As the development of the CLV has depended very
much on foreign savings, it is important to look at
the adequacy of capital flows and external debt of
these countries.
Over the period 2001–5, net capital flows to
Cambodia were more than necessary to finance the
CA deficit. Because FDI and ODA inflows have been
major sources of CA deficit financing and securities
markets remain non-existent, the risks of sudden
capital withdrawing from the country are low.
As at year-end of 2005, total outstanding public
debt (of which more than 90 per cent is external
debt) accounted for US$3.2 billion or equivalent to
52 per cent of GDP (Table 4). Nearly two-thirds of
the external debt is bilateral debt owed to the
Russian Federation and the USA during the period
of political strife. They have not been serviced as they
are under re-negotiation.7
Moreover, almost all of Cambodian external debt has
been long-term and appears to be under control due
to: (1) that most external debt is on concessional
terms, and debt service payments are modest in
terms of export; and (2) the debt sustainability
indicators appear to be well below the alarming
levels.
However, the risk of debt distress may result from low
revenue collection of the Cambodian government,
which could impede the government against covering
public debt and narrowing the country’s high budget
deficit. This can be observed during 2001–3 (Table 5).
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Table 5 Budget deficit of CLV, 1999–2005 (% GDP)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cambodia –3.8 –4.3 –6.2 –7.4 –5.5 –3.8 –2.8
Laos N/A –4.4 –4.0 –4.0 –5.8 –3.9 N/A
Vietnam –4.4 –3.4 –4.9 –4.1 –4.7 –4.0 –4.7
Source Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (2006), IMF (2005), Vo Tri Thanh (2006).
Laos has long been a highly indebted country, and
was put under the high risk category among low-
income countries. The ratios of total debt to GDP,
exports and government revenues are all rather
high. For instance, the ratio of total external debt to
GDP jumped from more than 82 per cent in 2000
to nearly 113 per cent in 2005 (Table 4). In principle,
Laos is eligible for high indebted poor country
(HIPC) debt relief; nevertheless, the authorities have
stated that they do not intend to seek HIPC
assistance.
Almost all of Laos’ external debt is long term,
representing a proportion of 98 per cent of total
debt during 1995–2002. Furthermore, about 70 per
cent of the debt stock at the year-end of 2003 was
concessional loans from bilateral and multilateral
creditors (primarily the World Bank and the ADB).
The biggest bilateral creditor is the Russian
Federation, accounting for almost 80 per cent of the
stock of bilateral debt at year-end of 2003 (the debt
is under negotiation).
The debt projections of the IMF (2004) show that, in
the medium-term, the debt service burden is
manageable, but only if economic reforms, especially
the fiscal ones, are maintained. Revenue collection in
Laos has been virtually as low as in Cambodia but
much lower than in Vietnam. For example, during
2002–3, Laotian total tax revenue was equivalent to
9.1 per cent of GDP compared with 7.5 per cent in
Cambodia during the 2000–2 period and 15.8 per
cent in Vietnam for the same period (IMF 2004).
Low revenue collection may result from the
country’s deep-rooted structural weaknesses such as
(1) inadequacy in technical capacity of the revenue
administration; (2) a highly decentralised revenue
administration, in which provinces have weak
incentives to collect and remit revenue to the
national budget; and (3) proliferation of tax
exemptions to stimulate investments, which has
further narrowed the revenue base (IMF 2004).
In general, Vietnam’s CA deficits during the 1990–8
and 2002–5 periods were mostly financed by FDI
inflows,8 accounting for 105 per cent and 161 per
cent of the CA balance, respectively (Table 6). ODA,
80 per cent of which being concessional loans, has
also been an important medium and long-term
financing source since 1999. Commercial loans are
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Table 6 Vietnam’s CA balance and its financing sources, 1990–2005
1990–8 1999–2001 2002–5
Annual Annual Annual
average % CA average % CA average % CA 
(US$ million) balance (US$ million) balance (US$ million) balance
Current account balance –1048.6 100.0 869.7 100.0 –977.3 100.0
Capital account balance 1051.2 – –295.3 – 2,804.3 –
FDI (net) 1095.9 – 532.0 61.2 1577.5 –
Medium- and long-term 
borrowings (net) –38.2 3.6 491.0 56.5 637.8 –
Short-term borrowings (net) –6.4 0.6 –919.3 – 6.3 –
Portfolio investment 750 (2005) –
Deposit –399.0 – 395.3 –
Errors and omissions –168.3 16.1 –266.0 – –504.3 51.6
Overall balance –165.7 15.8 308.3 35.5 1322.8 –
Notes FDI comprise disbursed equity and external borrowings. Portfolio investment took place in 2005 by
issuing US$750 million of the government bonds in international markets.
Source State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) and authors’ calculation (cited from Vo Tri Thanh 2006).
made predominantly by long-term debt, accounting
for 90 per cent during 2000–3.
Since the agreement on debt restructuring with the
Russian Federation in 2000, Vietnam’s external debt
has substantially decreased. In relative terms, total
external debt as proportion of GDP went down
from 41.1 per cent in 2000 to 35.2 per cent
(US$18.2 billion) in 2005 (Table 5). As a result,
Vietnam has escaped from a HIPC status within a
short time span.
Vietnam’s ratio of total debt to export (51.7 per cent
in 2005) and debt service ratio (6.1 per cent in 2005)
are all well within a ‘controllable’ level, and projected
to decline in the next 3–4 years. The country’s
external debt will continue to increase in absolute
terms, but her capacity to serve foreign debt is still
regarded as relatively high.
There are, however, some concerns about external
debt management. The debt-induced finance has
constituted a majority of capital inflow in Vietnam
and hence, the costs of financing CA deficit may
increase. The FDI inflow has also entailed
considerable commercial loans. Moreover, the
proportion of non-concessional loans has tended to
increase and borrowings at floating interest rates
become more vulnerable to world interest rate
fluctuations. Finally, the capital-using efficacy has
been diminishing and therefore, if not properly dealt
with, it would adversely affect external sustainability
in the forthcoming years.
Some new arising issues should also be properly
addressed. First, a surge of portfolio inflow in 2006
into Vietnam’s stock market may increase the risks of
capital reversal related to the overheating of the stock
market, which has been driven by irrational exuberance,
sizeable foreign participation and the herding behaviour
of investors. Second, during 2002–5, the overall surplus
increased significantly. Except for the increasing
contribution of FDI and ODA, this was also due to
withdrawal of deposits by Vietnamese commercial
banks from abroad to provide credit for some ‘white
elephant’ projects and issuing government bonds to
the value of US$750 million in the international market
(to make on-lending to the state-owned ship-building
corporation VinaShin). Third, the errors and omissions in
the BoP are still high due to statistical errors and, to a
certain extent, reflect shortcomings in controlling
short-term capital flows.
4 Fragility of financial sector
After decades of civil strife, Cambodia has made
tremendous efforts in reintroducing a banking
system, particularly via easing licensing requirements.
This resulted in the proliferation of weak joint
venture banks, whose problems eventually hampered
the return of confidence in the banking system.
Efforts to strengthen the banking system were then
accelerated and led to closures of 15 banks under a
re-licensing programme. Meanwhile, Cambodia also
emphasised restructuring the remaining SOCB (the
Foreign Trade Bank – FTB) in the direction of
privatisation and strengthening commercial decision-
making. Additionally, accounting standards and
banking supervision have recently been strengthened.
The banking reforms have brought about significant
fruits. To date, the banking sector has had low levels
of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the context of
rapid credit expansion.9 Indeed, the NPL ratio fell
remarkably from 12.4 per cent in 2000 to 7.8 per
cent in 2005, although it is still quite high. The
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of Cambodia’s banking
system has also been significantly improved. As of
September 2006, CAR stood at 28.3 per cent, much
higher than the regulatory limit of 15 per cent (which
used to be 20 per cent until 2005) and well above
the 8 per cent Basel Accord requirement.
Despite considerable progress in restructuring,
Cambodia’s banking system still has numerous
weaknesses and constraints.
First, there has been an extremely high degree of
‘dollarisation’ in the Cambodian economy. As of the
end of 2005, 94 per cent of deposits and 93 per cent
of lending were made in US dollars. This can also be
observed in the microfinance sector, whose credit risk
may be higher, as up to 58 per cent of microfinance
loans are lent to the agriculture sector.
Second, the banking sector is highly concentrated.
The top five banks already account for 71 per cent of
total deposits and the top three banks represent
62 per cent of total credit. The concern over loans
concentration was addressed by the National Bank
of Cambodia (NBC) in November 2006 through
amendment of the regulation governing large
exposure loans.
Third, credit risk is high due to the fact that banking
returns on asset (ROA) is very low (2.4 per cent), yet
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the interest rate is very high (18 per cent per year)
despite enormous efforts to restrict interest hikes.
This may result from the lack of effective legal
framework and difficulties in finding creditworthy
customers, which require commercial banks to set
high interest rates to compensate for operation costs
and interest expenses.
Fourth, Cambodia’s banking regulations still do not
adequately conform to the Basel Capital Accord.
According to an informal assessment by the IMF,
several concerns were raised as the 25 Core
Principles were not covered by the law and
regulations. Another barrier is the development level
of the banking system: Cambodia’s banking system is
very young in terms of the base it stands on (public
confidence, regulatory and legal frameworks) and its
sophistication (products, information system and
human resource). Hence, the NBC set a higher CAR
for banks than as set out in the Basel I. Far from full
implementation of Basel I, the NBC now focuses on
the compliance with the 25 Core Principles, the
foundation of effective banking supervision. As for
Basel II, Cambodia needs more time.
In conjunction with market-oriented reforms and
liberalisation, Vietnam has substantially reorganised
its banking sector in the late 1980s and continued
to do so to a lesser extent during the 1990s. In
early 2000, the banking reforms concentrated on
restructuring the four large SOCBs and putting
them on a commercial footing. The reforms also
aim at establishing and strengthening regulatory,
supervisory, and institutional frameworks for more
efficient banking and consolidating numerous small
and undercapitalised joint stock banks (JSBs).
Recent important steps have been, for example,
phasing-out of policy lending; phasing-in of
prudential standards (e.g. the requirement on
CARs); improving accounting and disclosure
standards, transparency by adopting International
Accounting Standards (IAS) and audits and loan
classification (IMF 2004).
Laos has similarly undertaken banking reforms but
with less emphasis on banks’ internal capacity for
change. To date, important measures to avoid further
deterioration of banks’ balance sheets comprise
prohibition of lending to defaulting borrowers,
commitment to avoiding new non-commercial
lending, setting credit ceilings, and providing
incentives for improving banking performance.
It is worth repeating that, unlike Cambodia, Vietnam
and Laos made utmost efforts to restructure their
SOCB-dominated banking systems and foster non-
state commercial banks’ development. In particular,
Vietnam has strongly committed to opening its
financial sector, including the banking sector, for other
WTO members to operate from 2007 onwards.
Despite such progress, numerous problems and
concerns remain for the banking sector in both
countries. Contrary to the case of Cambodia, in
Vietnam and Laos, the SOCBs have been major
players in both borrowing and lending markets
(70–80 per cent of total market shares) and the most
important lenders for SOEs. Apart from directed
lending, connected nepotism led to inefficient
investment projects and improper supervision which,
in turn, has for years resulted in sizable NPLs,
particularly by the SOEs. In 2003, Vietnam’s NPL
ratio to GDP (7.7 per cent) outnumbered those of
Laos (3.0 per cent) and Cambodia (1.1 per cent)
(Unteroberdoerster 2004). Owing to the country’s
utmost efforts, its ratio of NPLs to total loans fell
sharply to 3.4 per cent in 2005. Nevertheless, under
international loan classification, the ratio would be
three- or four-fold higher. Similarly, NPL ratios in
Laotian SOCBs ranged from over 20 per cent to
about 70 per cent, with about 70 per cent of all
NPLs considered state related, i.e. lent to SOEs or
for policy purposes.
Like Cambodia, Laos has suffered from very high
dollarisation. The ratio of foreign currency deposits is
extremely high in Laos, accounting for about 80 per
cent of its money supply. Despite a lessening
influence on Laos’ economy after the Asian crisis, the
Thai baht is still widely used in Laos. Except for
payment for daily necessities and utilities made in the
domestic currency of kip, payment is mostly made in
baht or US dollars (Hayashi 2003). To a lesser extent,
Vietnam has also been facing the problem of
dollarisation. Measured as ratio of foreign currency
deposits to M2, dollarisation in Vietnam remained
stable between 20–23 per cent in the mid-1990s;
started to increase in 1997 to reach a peak of 31.7 per
cent in 2001; before dropping to 24.4 per cent in
2005 (Vo Tri Thanh 2006).
The maturity mismatch in Vietnam’s banking system is
also of concern. Despite upward tendency of
medium- and long-term deposits, the short-term
ones still account for 75 per cent of total deposits.
Thanh et al. How Have the CLV Economies been Exposed to Financial Vulnerabilities?104
Meanwhile, the commercial banks have been allowed
to use about 25–30 per cent of short-term deposits
to make medium- and long-term loans. In fact, the
share of these loans in total credit increased from
22 per cent in 1995 to about 40 per cent in recent
years. The risks may be higher in the presence of
directed lending and moral hazard, especially related
to loans to the efficacy-questionable big projects.
The currency mismatch was most severe during
1999–2002 due to a sharp increase in foreign currency
deposits and a decrease in foreign currency loans,
respectively measured as the shares in total deposits
and total loans (Figure 2). It has recently been
narrowed, but is still problematic due to its sensitivity
to exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations,
especially in the context of high dollarisation.
The credit structure by sector has changed slightly
despite a considerable shift in economic structure.
Indeed, the shares of total outstanding loans to
agriculture–forestry–fishery and industry sector in
1995 were 26.5 per cent and 37.5 per cent,
respectively; in 2005, the corresponding figures were
29.7 per cent and 39.8 per cent (SBV 2006). The
highly fragmented banking market caused by
commercial banks assigned to lend to particular
sectors10 has to a certain extent restrained the risk-
sharing of banking system to external shocks and
narrowed borrowing choices of businesses.
Of other concern, the SOCBs give priority to asset
growth over profitability and capital adequacy,
allowing interest rate margins to erode tremendously
as they have largely refrained from raising lending
rates while offering higher deposit rates to finance
rapid credit growth. As a result, capital asset ratios
(under domestic accounting standards) declined
further, and SOCB restructuring has likely become
more costly (Unteroberdoerster 2004).
Vietnam’s banking system is still vulnerable due to
limited supervision, monitoring and governance
capacity. On-site monitoring and supervision is
constrained due to inadequate quantity and quality of
human resource. Off-site supervision, meanwhile, fails
to meet contemporary requirements in compiling and
processing information. Lending supervision is yet to
cover all credit-related financial institutions due to
lack of effective collaboration among authorised
agencies and de facto institution-based financial
system governance. Certain international practices
and standards have recently been adopted; yet
banking governance standards are generally yet to
meet the CAMEL and Basel provisions.
Vietnam’s capital market is still in the early stage of
development. The stock market only started
operating in 2000, but with enormous growth
potential. The equitisation of SOEs, including big
general corporations and SOCBs, has significantly
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Figure 2 Ratios of foreign currency deposits to total deposits and foreign currency loans to total credit
in Vietnam, 1996–2005
Thanh et al. How Have the CLV Economies been Exposed to Financial Vulnerabilities?106
Box 1 Can a bubble-and-bust happen with the Vietnamese stock market?
In 2006, Vietnam’s stock market skyrocketed in terms of market capitalisation, price, number of listed
companies and investors’ accounts, participation of securities companies, and investment
management funds (see below). Approximately, US$0.8–1.2 billion of foreign indirect investment
entered Vietnam in the first 10 months of 2006. About 70 per cent of this flow was invested in
stocks, bonds and property (30 per cent parked as deposits with the banking system). In December
2006, there were 1,700 accounts of foreign investors owning about 25–30 per cent of listed stocks.
2006 (year-end) 2005 (year-end)
Market capitalisation (% of GDP) 22.77% (US$14 billion) 1.1%
VN-index (HCMCSTC) 752 305
HASTC-index (HASTC) 243 91.3
Number of listed firms 193 41
HCMCSTC 106 32
HASTC 87 9
Investment funds 4 1
Securities companies 55 14
Management investment funds 18 6
Number of investors’ accounts 100,000 30,000
Note HCMC STC: Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading Centre (established in 2000). HN STC: Hanoi
Securities Trading Centre (established in 2005).
Key factors behind the market development, inter alia, can be the country’s WTO accession and its
bright outlook in subsequent years, irrational exuberance and sizeable foreign participation, including
the overseas Vietnamese in Russia and Eastern Europe; and herding behaviour spreading among the
unsophisticated domestic short-term individual investors in the context of lack of information
disclosure and transparency. The number of listed firms increased even more rapidly, perhaps in
response to the due expiration of the provided to listed companies’ incentive in the form of corporate
income tax deduction. It is worth noting that the total value of OTC stock market is estimated to be
three–six times higher than that of the formal market.
In response, Vietnam’s State Securities Commission (SSC) has repeatedly warned investors of risks
associated with the overheating market development and, simultaneously, undertaken measures to
mitigate risks and prevent market collapse. The first measure undertaken in December 2006 was to
restrain the size of stocks-collateralised loans and loans to bank-backed securities companies, and
other (financial institution-backed and ‘independent’) securities companies. A few days later, the SSC
promulgated six measures to improve regulation and monitoring of securities market’s operations.
First, as the Prime Minister decided to postpone the lifting of maximum shares of listed companies
permitted to foreign investors, the SSC would try to inform the market of this information as quickly
as possible. Second, the SSC would cooperate with the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) to monitor
lending for security investment, repo transactions and other transactions related to security
collateralisation of commercial banks. Third, the SSC also acts to investigate the securities companies
which are reported to discriminate between customers, and/or misuse information. Fourth, the SSC
shall require the listed companies to disclose and disseminate their operational and financial results in
2006, to better inform investors in the market. Fifth, re-registration would be implemented for
representative offices of foreign investment funds in Vietnam. Sixth, the SSC strives to promote
further information disclosure, so that the investors can make rational investment decisions. 
Source Authors’ compilation and estimation from various sources. 
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increased opportunities for investors, whereas
barriers to foreign investment continue to be
relaxed. The bond market is still very small. In 2006,
total outstanding bonds were equivalent to 10 per
cent of GDP and only 3 per cent of total outstanding
debt was of corporate bonds. Moreover, nearly all
Government bonds are on primary issues, while
secondary trading has been quite rare.
In Vietnam, the last few years have seen two new
problems which stem largely from the real-estate-
and stock-collateralised loans. The former are related
to the frozen real estate market, while the latter are
to the booming stock market. Notably, both the
frozen real estate market and booming stock market
have many hidden risks, particularly a bubble-and-bust
one which can eventually create huge NPLs for banks,
or even cause a collapse of the financial market if
managed improperly. Several recent measures by
Vietnam’s government for improving regulations and
monitoring the stock market have obviously revealed
its concern about the market development (Box 1).
An important issue for the government is how to
deter perceived ‘speculative’ interest in Vietnam,
while retaining investment needed for the
development of Vietnam’s economy (ANZ 2007).
The current conditions of the real estate market and
stock market may also erode the development of the
country’s infant bond market, arguably important for
reducing both currency and maturity mismatches in
the financial market. It can be said that, in 2006, the
very active stock transactions have totally crowded
out bond transactions. Unlike previous years, in
2006, there were no bond transactions in formal
securities market and the urban bonds were much
less liquid.
5 Exchange rate regime and international
reserves
Cambodia and Laos have adopted a dual exchange
rate regime since 2002 (Fan 2004) after a prolonged
period of high inflation. The official exchange rate,
applying to external transactions by the government
and state enterprises, is adjusted daily to maintain a
spread of less than 1 per cent and 1.5 per cent in
Cambodia and Laos, respectively, against the market
rate which applies for all other transactions
(UNESCAP 2005).
In 1989, Vietnam officially abandoned and unified its
multiple exchange rates. Since then, the exchange
rates for transactions have been set within an
adjusting band around the official rate announced by
the SBV. The band was gradually widened from
0.5 per cent in 1991 to 10 per cent in October 1997 in
response to the Asian crisis. Since February 1999, the
SBV began announcing the average inter-bank
exchange rate of the previous working day, but the
band for transactions has been tightened remarkably
to 0.1 per cent. The band was widened to 0.5 per
cent in December 2006.
All three countries have seemingly attempted to use
the nominal exchange rate ‘anchor’ to restrain
inflation. During 2002–5, the Cambodian riel
depreciated by 2.11 per cent on average (NBC 2006),
while the Laotian kip depreciated by less than 4 per
cent during 2002–4. During 2004–6, the
Vietnamese dong depreciated by about 1 per cent per
annum against the US$. Moreover, as the CLV have
all suffered from high dollarisation, which can be
seen as mobile short-run capital flows ‘within-the-
economy’, the effectiveness of monetary policy can
be undermined to a significant extent.
All three countries, therefore, have paid careful
attention to the exchange rate policy. Cambodia has
adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime
and the objective of its exchange rate policy is
confined to price stability rather than supporting
export industry. Since the exchange rate stands
largely under political and psychological factors, it is
important for the monetary authority to step into
the local foreign exchange markets. The US dollar
auction has been used carefully, but not to deal with
depreciation arising from fundamental imbalance or
to resist global pressure (Beresford et al. 2004). The
exchange rate regime in Laos is also regarded as
‘managed floating’.
The exchange rate arrangement of Vietnam is
classified as a ‘pegged regime within horizontal
bands’. The country is currently concerned about the
continued upward pressure on local currency due to
a surge in capital inflows. Using sterilisation to keep
local currency from appreciation while avoiding
inflationary pressure could be very costly. Another
concern is how to develop an effective hedging
mechanism for exchange rate transactions. To date,
the derivative instruments such as forward, option
and swap have been adopted in the country’s foreign
exchange market, but are still at an infant stage of
development.
Though derivatives may pose some macroeconomic
risks, they do help protect companies and banks from
risks. Therefore, a careful assessment may be
required of the desirable pace and modalities for
development of the derivatives markets.
A positive observation is that gross foreign reserves
have risen in all three countries. Yet in relative terms,
they have tended to decline in recent years. Judging
by the IMF optimal criteria (IMF 1998), they also
appear to be low and far from being optimal (six
months of imports of goods and services) (Table 7).
Furthermore, the size of foreign reserves seems to
be insufficient, considering the vital role of foreign
reserves in protecting the economy from
policy/external shocks, especially those linked to the
capital account. In these cases, dollarisation further
complicates the problem, since it could be similar to
the foreign exchange liquidity problem in having too
much short-term external debt; panic could happen
if it is perceived that the supply of foreign currencies
may not be forthcoming.
The adequacy of the level of foreign exchange
reserves should also be examined in relation to the
health of the financial system and the
appropriateness of the exchange rate regime.
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
After two decades of market-oriented reforms and
international economic integration, the CLV
countries have recorded impressive achievements,
notably high economic growth. Current prospects
for a financial crisis appear to be relatively low for
CLV as fertile grounds for its eruption, such as over-
borrowing syndrome, severe currency and maturity
mismatch, long-lasting fixed exchange rate, etc. have
not co-existed.
Despite the possibility of sustaining high growth in the
medium term, vulnerabilities of economic growth and
financial systems still remain in the CLV. Important
reasons for such concern are that, to a different
extent, these economies (1) still rely significantly on
external resources to finance the investment–savings
gap in economic development; meanwhile, domestic
capability to serve and absorb efficiently those
resources is limited; (2) can be hit by international
trade shocks and disputes, and a global recession; and
(3) have been financially nurtured by ailing banking
systems caused largely by a legacy of previous distorted
macroeconomic management schemes; (4) have very
large levels of dollarisation (especially Cambodia and
Laos), which – as is known from international
experiences – can imply greater vulnerability to shocks.
While failing to meet international standards and
best practices, each individual financial system has its
own peculiar weaknesses and constraints.
Cambodia’s banking system has long been
disadvantaged by an insufficiently developed
regulatory framework, weak intermediaries and low
public confidence. Those of Laos and Vietnam,
meanwhile, have suffered heavily from NPLs and
other consequences left by a centrally planning
mechanism. Vietnam’s stock market is still in the
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Table 7 CLV’s foreign reserves, 2000–5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cambodia
Gross foreign reserves (US$ million) 502 587 776 816 943 952
Gross foreign reserves (months of imports) 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.5
Laos
Gross foreign reserves (US$ million) 141 133 196 216 225 NA
Gross foreign reserves (months of imports) 2.6 2.6 3.5 3.2 3.0 NA
Vietnam
Gross foreign reserves (US$ million) 3,417 3,675 4,121 6,224 7,041 8,369
Gross foreign reserves (months of imports) 2.6 2.7 2.5 3.0 2.6 2.7
Source ADB (2005) (for Laos), ICSEAD (2006) (for Vietnam), Cambodia Ministry of Economy and Finance (2006)
(for Cambodia) and authors’ estimation.
early stage of development, but risks have already
emerged, given its meteoric rise. Also, Vietnam
currently lacks several fundamental conditions for
sound development of the bond market, especially
the corporate bond market.
Therefore, this article suggests the following common
and country-specific policies to sustain CLV economic
growth and to foster sustainable financial systems in
the context of deepening economic integration.
First, sustainable economic growth in the CLV countries
requires further market-oriented reforms and the
strengthening of macroeconomic fundamentals. The
WTO and/or other international commitment-driven
institutional adjustments can play a crucial role in this
process. The countries need to improve their business
environment to attract both domestic private
investment and FDI. ODA should be utilised more
efficiently and transparently, which depends on both
coordination among donors and capacity building for
the host countries. Due attention should also be paid
to diversifying exports and improving the quality of
human resource.
Laos and Vietnam should be more serious about
tackling public investment inefficiency. For Cambodia
and Laos, significantly increasing domestic savings
will provide a crucial additional pool for local private
sector development. This depends not only on
income growth but also on people’s confidence in
the banking system.
Second, as the securities markets of the three countries
are either non-existent or only at an early stage of
development, having a sound banking system is vital.
There are pressing needs to improve regulatory
framework, to strengthen banking supervision, to
improve risk management, to apply widely
international auditing and accounting standards, to
recapitalise commercial banks, and to enhance
human resource capacity.
Regarding Cambodia, it is crucial to promote
financial intermediation, especially lending activities.
Accordingly, the country needs to: (a) strengthen the
Credit Information Sharing (CIS) system, promote the
use of international standards, practices of
accounting standards and corporate financial
statements; (b) strengthen contract enforcement;
and (c) enhance the availability and quality of financial
services in rural areas.
Meanwhile, Laos and Vietnam should go towards
creating a competitive level playing field for banking
of all forms. It is vital to strengthen creditor rights by
providing banks with more effective means to
resolve NPLs, especially to loss-making SOEs.
Connected lending should also be prevented. In
general, outcomes of banking reforms largely
depend on progress in SOE reform and enforcement
of hard budget constraints.
To resolve the NPL problem, Vietnam’s SOCBs need a
stronger mandate. The delay in equitisation of the
VietcomBank and Mekong Housing Bank is problematic.
The recent establishment of the Vietnam Development
Bank (2006) and the decision to equitise four SOCBs in
2007 – including VietcomBank, IncomBank, Bank for
Investment and Development and the Mekong Housing
Bank – are expected to help mitigate the NPL problem
and strengthen their soundness in the coming years.
Moreover, the projects financed by Government
investment bonds through on-lending should be subject
to rigorous screening and supervision. Effective
enforcement of the new anti-corruption laws to curb
corruption and prevent the waste of public funds would
be an integral part of this endeavour.
Third, having a more balanced financial system should be
a long-term objective of the CLV. This contributes not
only to enhancing efficient resource allocation and
to mitigating financial risks, but also to an effective
engagement of the CLV in regional financial
integration.
Cambodia and Laos should give priority to establish
government bond markets. To mobilise additional
capital for development and to strengthen corporate
governance, it is important for both countries in the
long term to have their joint-stock companies listed
in stock exchanges. Due to their relatively small size,
it is perhaps more rational to encourage their
businesses to go floating abroad rather than
establishing their own stock exchanges. Another
option would be to develop regional stock markets.
For Vietnam, the key is to lay down all fundamental
conditions for sound development of her capital
market. This requires establishment and/or
strengthening of financial institutions, secondary
government bond market, financial regulations, credit
rating companies, judicial systems, accounting and
disclosure standards, and clearing and settlement
arrangements. Currently, it is also important for
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Vietnam to properly regulate stock market-related
credit (with the need to study establishing some limits
on credit levels for this purpose), to discourage insider
trading, and to enhance information disclosure and
transparency and professionalism of individual
investors. Together with growing scope for securities
market operations after the WTO accession, three
securities-related regulators – namely, the SSC and
the Ministry of Finance and the SBV – need to adopt
a unified framework to detect vulnerabilities
associated with portfolio capital movements.
Fourth, experience has shown that financial crises can
follow an inappropriate sequencing of financial and
capital account liberalisation. Therefore, the CLV should
have a proper roadmap or sequencing for financial
integration and liberalisation. In a widely adopted
roadmap, trade liberalisation should first be
introduced and coupled with structural reforms;
followed by internal financial liberalisation and finally,
external financial liberalisation to ensure a safe,
proper process of multi-stage liberalisation.
In principle, a good choice of exchange rate regime
needs to be consistent with the sustainable
international competitiveness of the exchange rate
and to have room for exchange rate fluctuations to
provide some space for domestic monetary policy. In
practice, the economies with rather closed CA can
pursue an adjustable peg exchange rate scheme. ADBI
and APF (2000: 12) emphasised that these economies
‘should give high priority to building a strong banking
system and sound long-term, domestic-currency
denominated securities markets’; they ‘should also
strive for strong macroeconomic fundamentals’, such
as low inflation, and high domestic saving and
investment rates. These recommendations seem to be
relevant to the case of Vietnam.
At present, Cambodia and Laos seem to be quite
comfortable with their exchange rate regimes. Yet
the choice of dual exchange rate regime remains
questionable. Dual exchange rate regime may be
acceptable in dealing with small size foreign
exchange market and pervasive information
asymmetry in the market. However, the benefits of
foreign exchange unification, at least to avoid
misallocation of resources, have been recognised by
the central banks in their long term objectives. Yet as
pointed out by Fan (2004), in bringing down inflation
and improving external balance while implementing
exchange rate unification, suitable fiscal and
monetary policies must be adopted to support these
goals. In addition, it is unclear how Cambodia and
Laos can continue with such an extremely high
degree of dollarisation in the long term. Indeed, an
important policy objective may be to significantly
reduce the degree of dollarisation of those
economies.
Fifth, the CLV countries lack information and accurate and
consistent statistics, particularly financial and BOP statistics.
Moreover, these statistics do not conform well to
international standards, despite considerable
improvements with respect to their collection,
processing and dissemination. Obviously, their quality
should be improved and only based on that, the Early
Warning System for detecting vulnerability of financial
system, which is of great importance in the coming
years, can be developed and used with high credibility.
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Notes
* The opinions expressed in this article are solely
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the affiliated institutions, the Central
Institute for Economic Management of Vietnam
(CIEM) and the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC).
1 The reforms were sponsored by the International
Monetary Fund and included an overhaul of the
tax system, a two tier-banking system, tariff
reduction and privatisation.
2 In 2000, Vietnam and the USA signed the
Bilateral Trade Agreement, which became
effective in December 2001. Since then, Vietnam
has also joined several regional integration clubs
such as ASEAN + 1 Free Trade Areas. Most
importantly, Vietnam became the 150th member
of the WTO in November 2006.
3 Note that the re-imposition of restrictions by the
USA and EU on clothing imports from China in
the second half of 2005 was a key factor
contributing to the increase in Cambodian
garment exports.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, data in this sub-
section is adapted from or calculated based on
the IMF (2005).
5 During 2001–4, the averaged share of intra-GMS
(Greater Mekong Subregion) trade to total trade
of Laos was highest (63 per cent) among six GMS
countries (Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar,
Thailand and Vietnam).
6 In Vietnam, the ‘state investment’ consists of
investment outlays from budget, state credit
(mostly associated with ODA) and investment
attained from SOE profits.
7 See: www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/TMR-
foreign-direct-investment/chap-2.pdf
8 In 2004–5, the capital account attained US$2,753
million and US$3,179 million, respectively. FDI
capital flow accounted for the biggest part of the
total capital inflow to Vietnam, amounting to
US$1,610 million in 2004 and US$1,850 million in
the same period.
9 During 2002– August 2006, total credit to the
economy rose 26.4 per cent annually on average,
channelled primarily towards manufacturing, retail
and wholesale sectors, and personal consumption.
10 For instance, the Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development is assigned primarily to provide
credits to agricultural and rural sector.
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 4  July 2007 111
References
ADB (2005) Asian Development Outlook 2005:
Promoting Competition for Long-term Development,
Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank 
ADBI and APF (2000) Policy Recommendations for
Preventing Another Capital Account Crisis, Tokyo: ADBI
ANZ International Economics Monthly (February 2007)
‘Vietnam: Rising Risk of Capital Controls’
Beresford, Melanie; Nguon, Sokha; Roy, Rathin; Sau,
Sisovanna and Namazie Ceema (2004) The
Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction in Cambodia,
Phnom Penh: United Nations Development
Program (UNDP)
Cambodia Ministry of Planning (2006) National
Account of Cambodia 1993–2005, Phnom Penh:
Ministry of Planning, Royal Government of
Cambodia
Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (2006)
‘Cambodia Economic Report 2006’, paper
prepared for the Informal ASEAN+3 Finance and
Central Bank Deputies Meeting (AFDM+3), Siem
Reap, Cambodia
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM)
(2006) Vietnam’s Economy 2005, Hanoi: Political
Theory Publishing House
Fan, Emma Xiaoqin (2004) A Note on Dual/Multiple
Exchange Rates, ERD Policy Brief 26: May, Manila,
Philippines: Asian Development Bank 
Hayashi, Tomoko (2003) Experiences and Lessons of
Monetary and Financial Systems in East Asia,
Economic and Social Research Institute, March,
www.esri.go.jp/en/tie/ea/ea5-1e.pdf
ICSEAD (2006) ‘Recent Trends and Prospects for
Major Asian Economies’, East Asian Economic
Perspectives 17, February, Kitakyushu: The
International Centre for the Study of East Asian
Development
IMF (2006a) Cambodia: 2006 Article IV Consultation,
IMF Country Report 06/264d, Washington DC:
International Monetary Fund
IMF (2006b) International Financial Statistics June
2006, Washington DC: International Monetary
Fund
IMF (2006c) Vietnam: Selected Issues, IMF Country
Report 06/20, January
IMF (2005) Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Selected
Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report
05/9, January
IMF (2004) Vietnam: Selected Issues, IMF Country
Report 03/381: September
IMF (1998) Financial Programming and Policies,
Workshop Reading Materials, Hanoi: IMF
NBC (2006) NBC Annual Report 2006, Phnom Penh:
National Bank of Cambodia
State Bank of Vietnam (2006) Annual Report 2006,
Hanoi: SBV
Suiwah, Leung; Vo Tri Thanh and Kem Reat Viseth
(2005) Integration and Transition – Vietnam,
Cambodia and Lao PDR, Working Papers 05–1,
Asia Pacific School of Economics and
Government, Australian National University
UNESCAP (2005) Economic and Social Survey of Asia
and the Pacific 2005: Dealing with Shocks, New
York: UNESCAP
Unteroberdoerster, Olaf (2004) Banking Reform in the
Lower Mekong Countries, IMF Policy Discussion
Paper 04/5: September, Asia and Pacific
Department
Vo Tri Thanh (principal researcher) (2006) A Strategy
of Mobilizing and Utilizing Capital for Industrialization
and Modernization in Vietnam, Project KX-02-08
of the State Research Program KX-02
‘Industrialization and Modernization in Vietnam:
Roadmap and Paces’, Hanoi, October (in
Vietnamese)
Thanh et al. How Have the CLV Economies been Exposed to Financial Vulnerabilities?112
